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"FOREWORD: A SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964"*
Kenneth W. Mack
SYMPOSIUM ON THE FIFTIETH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, SMU Law Review, 2014
IN the popular, and sometimes scholarly, imagination, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 brings to mind images associated with the old Southern
racial caste system that the act helped undo: the now-familiar black
and white images of schoolchildren facing down firehoses and police dogs
in Birmingham, the historic signing ceremony in the White House with
President Lyndon Johnson surrounded by politicians and civil rights lead-
ers, and the image of thousands of protesters who marched and organized
to demand freedom. The Act was signed into law on July 2, 1964, after
years of grassroots protest, violence in the South, organizing and boycotts
attacking segregation in the North, civic engagement and lobbying by a
host of organizations, and the longest debate in Senate history. The result
was accomplished only after the breaking of the Southern filibuster that
had given segregationists a lock on national politics. Opponents fought
hard and long to block passage of the Act because many of its provisions
had the potential to change the basic understandings of Americans about
inequality (not just limited to race) and about federal power to remedy it.
In truth, that historic enactment was the product of organizing and ad-
vocacy that stretched back to the beginning of the twentieth century. Or-
dinary citizens and civil rights groups had pushed for federal anti-
lynching legislation since the 1920s and had advocated for federal legisla-
tion creating a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee since
the 1940s. Indeed, the Act came on the heels of the 1963 "March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom," where the marchers' official goals
included access to employment, housing, public accommodations, educa-
tion, the voting booth, and desegregated schools-as well as a federal full
employment program.' Its enactment was followed by continued vio-
* I would like to thank Randall Kennedy and Paul Frymer for providing valuable
comments on an earlier version of this essay, and the editors of the SMU Law Review for
their assistance.
1. WILLIAM P. JONES, MARCH ON WASHINGTON: JOBS, FREEDOM, AND THE FORGOT-
TEN HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 174 (2013).
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lence, repression and activism that led to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
A long and contentious process led to these two historic statutes of free-
dom, but their enactment was not an endpoint of the story. In fact, the
Civil Rights Act's passage was followed by a renewed fight about the
nature of inequality that drew in a broad spectrum of actors at all levels
of American politics, and the Act continues to transform society to the
present day.
I. THINKING ABOUT LAW AT THE HALF-CENTURY MARK
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
This is an essay about how not to think about the 50th anniversary of
the Civil Rights Act, both from the lawyer's vantage point as well as the
historian's. One way to interpret the Act-a quite tempting way for law-
yers-is as a snapshot encompassing those familiar images surrounding
its enactment. This is tempting for lawyers because such an interpretation
would make it easier to apply our conventional skills and read the statute
as a text to be given a definitive interpretation. Viewed that way, the Act
might seem to be addressed to problems that existed in 1964 and that
persisted for perhaps a decade or two afterward-in short, directed to
problems of a society very different from our own. The Supreme Court,
for instance, has shown a willingness to apply such a synchronic reading
to the Voting Rights Act. The Court marked the near-50th anniversary of
the Voting Act by ruling that a key coverage provision of the statute was
addressed to problems that were of historical rather than present interest,
and concluded that the provision was unconstitutional. 2 "Things have
changed dramatically [since the mid-1960s]," wrote Chief Justice Roberts
in criticizing what he viewed as outdated provisions of the Voting Rights
Act.3 Recent Court decisions have manifested an intention to cut back on
the reach of the Civil Rights Act-although there seems to be little incli-
nation on the part of the Justices to redraw it as aggressively as they have
done with the Voting Rights Act.4 Nevertheless, some commentators see
hints of a possible aggressive reinterpretation of the Civil Rights Act in
recent opinions of the Court.5
For differing reasons, historians might be inclined to view a statute such
as the Civil Rights Act as a relatively straightforward text whose effects
on the larger culture and society we can map with some precision. In the
first decade or two after its enactment, the Act was seen by historians as a
centerpiece of what came to be known as the "Second Reconstruction"-
a renewal of a still-unresolved struggle for freedom that accompanied the
2. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
3. Id. at 2625.
4. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Vance v. Ball State
Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618
(2007).
5. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Racial Metamorphosis of Justice Kennedy and the Fu-
ture of Civil Rights Law, in THE NEW BLACK: WHAT HAS CHANGED-AND WHAT HAS
NOT-wrTH RACE IN AMERICA 80 (Kenneth W. Mack & Guy-Uriel Charles eds., 2013).
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abolition of slavery a century before. In recent years, however, social
movements, community organizing, and activities seemingly far removed
from formal law have become the preferred sites of attention for histori-
ans.6 For many scholars, the push for formal legal protections of basic
citizenship rights now seems not very important-at least compared to
the long history of organizing and protest that encompassed the civil
rights movement. Indeed, some scholars have argued that formal legal
victories set back efforts to achieve substantive equality-that such victo-
ries sometimes distract movement organizers from the real work of
achieving such equality and even invite backlash against the movement's
accomplishments.7
Much of this criticism has been directed to social reform litigation
rather than the different advocacy and political process that leads to legis-
lation. There simply has not been enough attention devoted to the con-
nections between reform movements and transformative statutes such as
the Civil Rights Act.8 Yet even on the subject of the Civil Rights Act
itself, some scholars have concluded that the Act was, at best, half a loaf -
important, to be sure, but hardly addressed to the deep structural, trans-
national issues of inequality that beset America in the late twentieth, and
now twenty-first century.9 For all its importance, perhaps the Act is a
mere "output," to employ a term used in a well-known legal history es-
say, a simple text that is the product of a larger set of forces located else-
where.10 Or perhaps, as many left-of-center scholars have argued, formal
rights such as those encompassed in the Act are, for a variety of reasons,
deeply disempowering for those seeking effective social change."
The Civil Rights Act, however, was a particularly open-ended, trans-
formative text. Its history shows that formal law sometimes opens new
6. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974); C.
VANN. WOODWARD, THINKING BACK: THE PERILS OF WRITING HISTORY, 81-90 (1986);
HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY, 1954-1980 (1981).
7. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); CHARLES M.
PAYNE, I'VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND THE MIS-
SISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE 315 (2007); DOUG McADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, 133-34, 184-85 (2nd ed.1999); ALDON
D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES OR-
GANIZING FOR CHANGE 35-37 (1984). Some of these scholars argue that statutes, particu-
larly the Civil Rights Act, have a different potential for social movements, but for reasons
other than the ones that I advance in this article.
8. One insightful exception to this trend is NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT
ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2006).
9. See, e.g., JUDITH STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, RUNNING AMERICA: RACE, ECONOMIC
POLICY, AND THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM 69-91 (1998).
10. William E. Forbath, Hendrik Hartog, & Martha Minow, Introduction: Legal Histo-
ries from Below, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 759, 761 (1985).
11. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE 299-320
(1997); Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 713 (2011). For a summary of this debate and a thoughtful rejoinder, see
Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State,
122 YALE L.J. 314, 369-83 (2012).
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debates rather than closing old ones. Indeed, the core text of the civil
rights movement-the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in
Brown12-quickly became, in the hands of movement activists, a text not
just about schools but about whether buses could remain segregated in
Birmingham, Alabama, and whether a local movement led by a young
Martin Luther King, Jr. could claim its first victory.13 Indeed, recent work
shows that, even within the educational context, the Brown opinion was a
particularly open-ended text that inspired educational reformers and ac-
tivists around the world to begin to debate and reform many aspects of
the educational system.14 The messiness of social movement politics often
escapes easy conclusions about the effects of formal law.15 The Civil
Rights Act is a prime example of one such text that continues to inspire
imaginative re-readings to this very day.
There are large stakes behind the question of how to read that statute,
and in differing ways, the essays gathered in this symposium by Ming Hsu
Chen, Ruqaiijah Yearby, and Leticia Saucedo help to reinforce that con-
clusion. Each of the essays shows what a transformative event the Civil
Rights Act was for nearly all Americans across the lines of color, lan-
guage, sex and region. Each essay shows how open-ended the Civil Rights
Act was (and remains), both as a text and as the product of history. Each
attests to the continued relevance of the Act, and to the long and un-
resolved societal conflicts about the nature of inequality a half a century
after its enactment. Chen focuses on agency guidance-regulatory inter-
pretations of the Act that "are not, strictly speaking, enforceable in
court." She reminds readers that one of the most significant effects of the
Act stemmed from a seemingly unimportant interpretation of its Title VI,
which prohibited discrimination in programs receiving federal funds. In a
1970 policy guidance, the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) interpreted Title VI's national origin
provision to require school districts to "take affirmative steps to rectify
the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program" to
children who are unable to "speak and understand the English lan-
guage." 16 That interpretation, she argues, caused a profound change in
the way that federal agencies defined national origin discrimination, and
through those agencies, the way that the larger society became cognizant
of the issue of minority language rights. The policy guidance became a
centerpiece of the 1974 Supreme Court ruling in Lau v. Nichols, where
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
13. Randall L. Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989); Robert Jerome Glennon, The Role of
Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus Boycott, 1955-1957, 9 LAW &
HisT. REV. 59 (1991).
14. MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN's WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA'S EDUCATIONAL
LANDMARK (2010).
15. For an important corrective, see TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT:
ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011).
16. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHrs, F.R. Doc. 70-9236, IDENTIFICATION OF DISCRIMINA-
TION AND DENIAL OF SERVICES ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL ORIGIN (July 17, 1970).
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the guidance played a key role in the Court's ruling in favor of a Title VI
challenge to school district policies that did not offer sufficient language
aid to Chinese-speaking students.17 Buttressed by the Court's imprima-
tur, the effect of the 1970 policy guidance can be felt today in thousands
of decisions on all levels of government to monitor and remedy language
discrimination, and have seeped into "policies and laws extending lan-
guage access to virtually all public institutions, providing lawful immigra-
tion status to undocumented students, and amending the Voting Rights
Act."' 8
Yearby also maps the transformative potential of Title VI, but her story
is one of unrealized promise and hope for a better future. She focuses on
the continued discrimination and outright segregation in "hospitals and
nursing homes that receive federal funds," and argues that Title VI's po-
tential to eradicate the racial disparities in access to health care remain
largely undeveloped. The Civil Rights Act, she notes, was preceded by a
decades-long struggle to undo the segregationist provisions of the Hill-
Burton Act, which provided federal funds for hospital construction but
explicitly authorized racially segregated facilities. That effort culminated
in a federal court ruling that barred race discrimination in hospitals re-
ceiving Hill-Burton funds shortly before the passage of the Civil Rights
Act. Yearby argues that despite the existence of Title VI and the creation
of the OCR to monitor and enforce compliance with the Act, there was
little federal effort to use the Act to attack existing racial segregation and
exclusion in the health system. Indeed, health disparities between blacks
and whites, she demonstrates at great length, have only grown more sali-
ent during the last 50 years. Like Chen, she focuses on the theory of ex-
clusion and discrimination that lies behind Title VI, noting that federal
agencies have discretion to enforce the Act using a disparate impact in-
terpretation. Yearby ends her piece by mapping out a transformative
agenda, encompassed within existing law, for taking the Civil Rights Act
into this uncharted territory in attacking a wide range of racial disparities
in the health care system.19
Saucedo also sees the Civil Rights Act as encompassing a forward-
looking and transformative agenda, this time encompassed within Title
VII of the statute, which prohibits employment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex and national origin. Focusing on the exploitation
of immigrant workers, Saucedo maps out an ambitious project whereby
the EEOC could use both its advisory and enforcement roles to redefine
workplace inequality. To this end, Saucedo draws on intersectionality the-
ory, which has become one of the more significant social-cultural inter-
ventions to emerge from the Civil Rights Act. Formulated by Professor
17. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
18. Ming-Hsu Chen, Language Rights as a Legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 67
SMU L. REv. 247 (2014).
19. Ruqaiijah Yearby, When is Change Going to Come?: Separate and Unequal Treat-




Kimberl6 Crenshaw, intersectionality emerges from the gaps in the Title
VII framework, which require victims of discrimination to allege one cat-
egory of discrimination-race, for instance, or sex, but not two. Intersec-
tionality focuses on the multiple intersecting identities that we inhabit as
we proceed through life, and the overlapping theories of discrimination
necessary to capture the equality struggles of, for instance, black wo-
men.20 Saucedo examines the crosscutting, multidimensional forms of in-
equality that confront immigrant workers. She offers a critique of the
EEOC's efforts to use single category analysis under Title VII and
presents an alternative account of workers' struggles within the Title VII
regime that, she believes, would be more fully protective of their
interests. 21
All three essays, in differing ways, help explain why the Civil Rights
Act was no ordinary statute, no ordinary "output" of contending social
and political forces, and why it would be a disservice to the Act's past and
present to view it as such. The Act is commonly seen as an effort to ban
discrimination in employment and public accommodations, but the en-
acted statute had eleven parts, many growing out of contests over the
nature of inequality that stretched back decades. Title I of the Civil
Rights Act regulated formal requirements for voting that were being used
substantively to limit access to the ballot-addressing itself to the meth-
ods of proof of qualification for voting, literacy tests, and other formal
voting requirements. 22 Its existence as part of our most famous Civil
Rights Act serves as a reminder that formal requirements for voting and
substantive voting rights have always been-and remain-intertwined.
Title II banned discrimination and segregation based on race, color, relig-
ion and national origin in many public accommodations.23 Title III au-
thorized the Attorney General to bring lawsuits when certain public or
state-owned facilities discriminated based on race, color, religion or na-
tional origin.24 Title IV made federal resources available for school de-
segregation and authorized the Attorney General to bring suits to
accomplish that objective.25 Title V extended the existence of the Civil
Rights Commission and empowered it to investigate suspected discrimi-
nation, advise government bodies, and serve as a national clearinghouse
of information on discrimination. 26 Title VI extended the reach of civil
rights law deep into many aspects of American life by prohibiting exclu-
sion or discrimination based on race, color or national origin in programs
20. Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED
THE MOVEMENT 357 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas
eds., 1995).
21. Leticia M. Saucedo, Intersectionality, Multidimensionality, Latino Immigrant
Workers, and Title VII, 67 SMU L. REV. 257 (2014).






receiving federal funds.27 Title VII banned discrimination, exclusion and
segregation based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin by
many employers, labor organizations and employment agencies. 28 Title
VIII authorized federal collection of recent voting and registration data
in order to document barriers to voting, based on race, color and national
origin.29 Title IX made it more likely that civil rights cases would be
heard in federal rather than state court by authorizing an appeal of a
federal district judge's decision to send a case back to state court. It also
authorized the Attorney General to intervene in certain cases, including
Fourteenth Amendment litigation. 30 Title X established a federal Com-
munity Relations Service to offer mediation in disputes involving discrim-
ination.31 Title XI provided an option for jury trials in many criminal
contempt proceedings brought under the Civil Rights Act. 3 2
II. THE LONG LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Like many statutes, the various provisions of the Civil Rights Act were
the products of both principle and compromise. Some of those provisions
were transformative in the context of the 1960s; others were partly exer-
cises in legislative logrolling; while others remained open-ended promises
that were made effective through future action and advocacy. Any honest
"legislative history" of those provisions, as documented in recent scholar-
ship, would have to stretch back decades before their enactment and em-
brace what some scholars have termed the "long civil rights
movement." 33 The roots of the advocacy that resulted in the Civil Rights
Act might be traced back to the early twentieth century, and even to the
latter stages of the nineteenth. The centerpiece of the story is the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),
founded in 1909, to redeem the promises of the first Reconstruction. The
interracial organization quickly inserted itself into national politics with








33. See Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses
of the Past, 91 J. AM. HisT. 1233 (2005). This particular formulation of the idea of the long
movement has been subject to criticism, although there is broad scholarly consensus on the
need to look to the longer arc of history to contextualize the 1950s and 1960s. See Sundiata
K. Cha-Jua & Clarence Lang, The 'Long Movement' as Vampire: Temporal and Spatial
Fallacies in Recent Black Freedom Studies, 92 J. AFRICAN-AMERICAN HIsT. 265 (2007);
Eric Arnesen, Reconsidering the "Long Civil Rights Movement," 10 HISTORICALLY SPEAK-
ING 31 (April 2009).
34. The most authoritative history of the NAACP's early years is PATRICIA SULLIVAN,




It is by no means a given that Congress could and would pass a statute
regulating employment discrimination in the 1960s. That achievement
was a direct product of developments that had been in motion since the
1930s when the NAACP, joined by a host of other organizations, ex-
panded its agenda. The labor market would remain an important part of
the group's advocacy up to and beyond the passage of the Act, despite
the common identification of the organization with Southern school de-
segregation.35 During the depression years, a young Thurgood Marshall
joined many other civil rights lawyers in defending the "Don't Buy
Where You Can't Work" movements, where African-Americans organ-
ized to boycott businesses that they believed did not employ and promote
sufficient numbers of black workers. The NAACP's Charles Houston,
who served as Marshall's mentor, spent the latter part of his career at-
tacking union discrimination and working to unite the advocacy efforts of
the NAACP and those of the more racially-inclusionary labor unions.36
Through both local studies and interpretive works, many historians in re-
cent years have documented the sometimes-friendly, sometimes-antago-
nistic interconnections between civil rights organizations and the labor
movement. 37 As long ago as the 1930s, blacks and whites would argue
over a set of questions that the Civil Rights Act would leave unresolved
and that we continue to debate to this day: whether non-discrimination in
the workforce meant simply the removal of formal racial barriers to jobs
and union participation, or rather meant actual substantive equality (en-
suring actual participation of minorities in the workforce). 38
As is commonly noted, Congress chose to lodge its power to enact the
Civil Rights Act primarily in the Commerce Clause.39 That choice grew
out of the activities of civil rights activists during the New Deal era, and
35. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, at 145-236; PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN
AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
(2008); RISA GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); MACLEAN, supra
note 8; David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law:
Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943-1972, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1071 (2011); Sophia Z. Lee, Hotspots in a Cold War: The NAACP's Postwar Workplace
Constitutionalism, 1948-1964, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 327 (2008); Kenneth W. Mack, Re-
thinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256
(2005).
36. GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 156-93 (1983); Mack, supra note 35, at 318-31.
37. See, e.g., ANTHONY CHEN, THE FIFrH FREEDOM: JOBS, POLITICS, AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1941-1972 (2009); PATRICIA SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE:
RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW DEAL ERA (1996); MARTHA BIONDI, To STAND AND
FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY (2003); NELSON
LICHTENSTEIN, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS (2002); BETH T. BATES, PULLMAN PORTERS
AND THE RISE OF BLACK PROTEST POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1920-1945 (2001); DAVID NEL-
SON, DIVIDED WE STAND: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUAL-
ITY (2001); ERIC ARNESEN, BROTHERHOODS OF COLOR: BLACK RAILROAD WORKERS
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2001); KEVIN BOYLE, THE UAW AND THE HEYDAY
OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1995).
38. Mark Tushnet, Book Review-Paul Moreno, From Direct Action to Affirmative Ac-
tion, 42 AM. J. LEG. HIsT. 337, 338 (1998).
39. On the debates that would result in the Commerce Clause rather than the Four-
teenth Amendment becoming the principal justification for the statute, in particular to
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of the constitutional revolution of the late New Deal. Recent writing has
exhaustively documented the racial discriminations and exclusions that
were written into key New Deal institutions such as the National Recov-
ery Administration, the Federal Housing Administration, and the Social
Security Administration. 40 That discrimination provided an entry point
for African-American lawyers and activists such as John P. Davis to help
shift the movement's advocacy to the labor market during the New Deal.
Davis, after taking Felix Frankfurter's pubic utilities seminar at Harvard
Law School, returned to his native Washington, D.C., where he eventu-
ally became the head of the Joint Committee for National Recovery, a
coalition of over twenty advocacy groups that lobbied for non-discrimina-
tion in federal programs and for economic rights. 41 While the formal coa-
lition was short-lived, its effort would lead directly to President
Roosevelt's wartime decision to prohibit discrimination based on "race,
creed, color, or national origin" in defense industries and government
service, and to create the wartime Committee on Fair Employment Prac-
tice (FEPC) to monitor compliance with that directive.42 By the end of
the war, the establishment of a permanent FEPC, as well as state-level
FEPCs, to police private discrimination became a core demand of the
civil rights movement.43
The ability of activists to make such demands, and indeed the power of
Congress to enact Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act, grew out of
the constitutional revolution of the late New Deal. As has been well doc-
umented by many scholars, the Roosevelt administration's experimental
response to the Great Depression prompted an intense debate about the
expansion of the administrative state and the power of the federal gov-
ernment to regulate economic life-a debate that, in conventional ac-
counts, was seemingly resolved by 1938.44 Civil rights activists were well
aware of the debate and saw their ongoing effort to write non-discrimina-
tion into economic life as buttressed by its resolution. By 1937, Philadel-
phia lawyer Raymond Pace Alexander was arguing in favor of what he
Title II of the Act, see Christopher Schmidt, The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18
WILLIAM & MARY Q. 767, 809-17 (2009).
40. For a useful summary, IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS
WHITE: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICA (2005).
41. Mack, supra note 35, at 331-45
42. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 27, 1941). The immediate cause of
Roosevelt's decision was labor leader A. Philip Randolph's threat to hold a march on
Washington to prompt federal action on discrimination. See Jones, supra note 1.
43. THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH 70-76 (2008); CHEN, supra note 37, at 35-46.
44. See, e.g., DANIEL R. ERNST, ToCQUEVILLE'S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940, 51-138 (2014); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING
THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998);
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995). For a summary of the differing accounts
of the longer history leading up to this moment, see Howard Schweber, Lochner v. New




called "the Right of Employment in all industries, of whatever charac-
ter," where the state exercised regulatory authority in the form of loans,
contracts, subsidies, or regulation. 45 A decade later, Houston was arguing
that his union discrimination litigation would establish a non-discrimina-
tion principle that "will apply to any public utility"-that is, any private
entity that was closely regulated by the federal government or received
significant federal assistance. 46 Indeed, one can draw a straight line from
the New Deal-era civil rights advocacy and jurisprudential debates to the
demand for, and inclusion of, basic economic rights in the statute enacted
30 years later.
When the civil rights bill was being framed in 1963 and 1964, Congres-
sional opponents attacked its constitutionality, and they had a point. The
statute brought many areas of citizenship rights within federal jurisdic-
tion, and worked against basic constitutional assumptions that one could
trace back to the end of Reconstruction. 47 Recent work in law and politi-
cal science has reinforced a point that needs emphasis-the development
of federal institutions that could assert authority over the civil rights of
private American citizens was no sure thing. Indeed, in its early years the
NAACP worked strategically as a political pressure group, lobbying suc-
cessive Presidents as well as Congress, and presenting careful arguments
to the Supreme Court on the scope of federal authority. 48 One of Hous-
ton's first pieces of work for the organization was a set of briefs that were
intended to convince the Department of Justice that it had authority to
act in response to a set of horrific instances of racial violence in the Deep
South. 49
The NAACP and its allied activists and organizations sought to shift
the bounds of federal authority-first through its anti-lynching campaign
and the development of national institutions that could directly protect
the basic rights of individual citizens.50 That effort worked against a set of
nineteenth-century rulings through which the Supreme Court had cut
back on the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments and had at-
tempted to lodge many basic civil rights at the state level. 5 ' In doing so,
the emerging movement was aided by the civil rights section (which be-
came the cvil rights division under the 1957 Act) of the Department of
45. See Raymond Pace Alexander, Notes for an Address: Why Philadelphia Needs
"The National Negro Congress" (Sept. 24, 1937).
46. Mack, supra note 35, at 344-45.
47. See MEGAN MING FRANCIS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
AMERICAN STATE (2014).
48. SULLIVAN, supra note 34; FRYMER, supra note 35, at 70-97; Engstrom, supra note
35, at 1114.
49. McNEIL, supra note 36, at 101-05.
50. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, at 61-145.
51. See, e.g., CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008); ROGERS M
SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997);
LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE NEGRO (1966); For a recent counter-argument, see PAMELA BRANDWEIN,
RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION (2011).
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Justice, which began to formulate aggressive theories of federal power to
attack economic exploitation of black workers in the South.52 While the
successes and failures of the NAACP's school desegregation campaign
have drawn much attention, what has often been overlooked is the consti-
tutional revolution necessitated by civil rights lawyers' and activists' ad-
vocacy around schools, criminal procedure, voting rights, and the like.5 3
The powers claimed in the Civil Rights Act are now a basic assumption of
our constitutional structure, even if the constitutional framework on
which they have been built has recently come under attack.54 In the
1960s, however, these developments were not a given, but rather built on
decades of advocacy and debates, which created a new set of assumptions
about federal power and institutional structures that made possible the
innovative set of powers claimed in the Civil Rights Act.
The popular image of the Civil Rights Act is that it was addressed pri-
marily to the problems of the 1950s and 60s-era Jim Crow South, but the
movement that brought it into being addressed problems of national
scope.55 In the North and the West, racial segregation and exclusion was
often pervasive in hotels, restaurants, swimming pools, and theaters.
Some Northern school districts explicitly segregated their students
through the mid-twentieth century.56 While the Southern sit-in movement
directed much attention on that region, it was in other parts of the coun-
try where the movement, and the legal framework, that would eventually
result in Title II of the Act found its initial footing. Northern black civil
rights lawyers often won their first legal victories against race discrimina-
tion in cases involving public accommodations.57 As late as the 1950s, the
Negro Travelers' Greenbook advised black Americans where they could
stay, eat and patronize public accommodations as they traveled in all
parts of the country.58 Straight through the 1960s, in cities like Philadel-
phia, civil rights activists and municipal bodies engaged in delicate negoti-
ations to place token black families on all-white blocks, bring token
integration to public accommodations like skating rinks, and overcome
employers' blanket bails on hiring any blacks into certain occupations 59
A violent mob famously greeted Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. when he
arrived in Chicago in the mid-1960s to confront Northern-style race
52. GOLUBOFF, supra note 35.
53. For a recent work that emphasizes this theme, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGIrrs REVOLUTION 63-104 (2014).
54. See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Scalia, Thomas,
Kennedy and Alito, dissenting) (questioning the late New Deal jurisprudential revolution
that validated the expansion of federal regulatory power).
55. FREEDOM NORTH: BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLES OUTSIDE THE SOUTH, 1940-1980
(Jeanne Theoharis & Komozi Woodard eds., 2003); SUGRUE, supra note 43, at 130-99,
286-312.
56. SUGRUE, supra note 43, at 130-99, 286-312.
57. Id.; FREEDOM NORTH: BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLES OUTSIDE THE SOUTH,
1940-1980 (Jeanne Theoharis & Komozi Woodard eds., 2003).
58. NEGRO TRAVELERS GREEN BOOK (1957).




Schools were also sites of sustained movement activism in the North.
As early as the 1940s, local black communities staged school boycotts to
protest explicit racial segregation in many Northern school systems.61 In
the 1960s, NAACP lawyers Robert Carter and Lewis Steele pushed a se-
ries of innovative cases challenging the intentional, but often nearly invis-
ible, means by which Northern school districts drew attendance zones and
used other means to enforce racial segregation in schools. 62 The Civil
Rights Act challenged commonsense assumptions held by white Ameri-
cans across the country, and it helped prompt a revolution in racial atti-
tudes that still remains incomplete.63
None of these developments, however, would necessarily lead to the
enactment of a federal civil rights bill, particularly one with the provisions
that eventually made it into the Act. To accomplish that goal, activists,
politicians, lawyers and civic leaders had to overcome both political and
jurisprudential hurdles that made it unlikely that the federal government
would assume such power. Civil rights leaders pushed Harry Truman to
establish his President's Committee on Civil Rights, whose famous re-
port, entitled To Secure These Rights, recommended federal action on
segregation, lynching, voting, employment discrimination, and in other
areas. More than two dozen states would adopt fair employment legisla-
tion by 1964, but the federal effort was stymied by opposition from
Republicans and Southern Democrats until the enactment of Title VII.64
More provocative was the Powell Amendment, which laid the ground-
work for the federal funding provisions of Title VI and built directly on
the New Deal era political and jurisprudential breakthroughs. In the
1940s, Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr., with help from
the NAACP, began attaching riders to legislation to deny federal funding
to state programs that practiced race discrimination. 65 When the Eisen-
hower Administration proposed a substantial school funding bill, Powell's
proposal, now known as the Powell Amendment, tied the Eisenhower
White House up in knots. Partly in response, Attorney General Herbert
Brownell proposed additional voting rights protections in what eventually
became the Civil Rights Act of 1957.66 That act finally broke the South-
ern filibuster threat that had bottled up federal legislation for decades,
but at the cost of a statute that stripped out federal authority to effec-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWYER 32-34, 247 (2012).
63. ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE
OF EQUAL RIGHTS 165-202 (2005).
64. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 43.
65. CHARLES V. HAMILTON, ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, JR.: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
OF AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 187, 226-35 (2001).
66. DAVID NICHOLs, A MATTER OF JUSTICE: EISENHOWER AND THE BEGINNING OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 114-18, 143-69, 252-57 (2007).
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tively protect minority rights.67 Much the same process happened three
years later with the Civil Rights Act of 1960.68
Upon taking office in 1961, President John F. Kennedy moved cau-
tiously on civil rights out of deference to the Southern wing of his party,
despite campaign promises of aggressive action.69 However, both the
President and Attorney General Robert Kennedy soon found themselves
confronted by a burgeoning national movement that ranged from march-
ers, sit-in protesters and freedom riders in the South, to the NAACP's
increasingly contentious campaign to desegregate Southern universities,
to school boycotts in Northern cities, to aggressive demands for black
access to jobs at urban public construction sites in places like Philadel-
phia.70 Prodded into action, the administration proposed what many ac-
tivists criticized as a tepid bill in early 1963.71 The original bill envisioned
by the administration included some patchwork fixes for existing voting
laws, assistance for school districts that voluntarily desegregated and a
simple extension of the fact-finding Civil Rights Commission created by
the 1957 Act.7 2 Yet, pushed by continued activism and television images
of civil rights protesters being beaten, the Kennedy administration even-
tually endorsed a much stronger bill later that year, which would finally
become the Civil Rights Act of 1964.73
The formal enactment process was just as contested, contentious and
open-ended as the long history that led to that moment. As noted above,
little of what is now seen as the core of the Civil Rights Act was in the
original Kennedy proposal, made in early 1963.74 By June, white
Northerners had been greeted by images of child protesters being ar-
rested in Birmingham, urban protests and unrest in the North, and a mass
march of over a hundred thousand people in Detroit headlined by King
and the increasingly confrontational Detroit Rev. Albert Cleage, Jr.75
That month, the growing national scale of the conflict led President Ken-
nedy to declare that "The fires of frustration and discord are burning in
every city, North and South."76 Justice Department lawyers drafted a bill
that would be denominated H.R. 7152, which now contained provisions
governing public accommodations, voting and the authority for the At-
torney General to initiate school desegregation suits, but not, as yet, any
employment discrimination mandate.77 The Act's famous employment
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. TODD PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: Two PRESIDENTS, Two PAR-
TIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 1-58 (2014).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL
RIGHTs ACT 23-77 (2014).
73. Id.
74. See PURDUM, supra note 69, at 54-85; RISEN, supra note 72, at 67-87.
75. ANGELA D. DILLARD, FAITH IN THE CITY: PREACHING RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE
IN DETROIT 271 (2007).
76. President John F. Kennedy, Civil Rights Address (June 11, 1963).
77. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 65-72.
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discrimination title would be added relatively late in the process, at the
behest of a coalition of groups led by the NAACP and the United Auto
Workers.78
The enactment process drew in a broad set of actors who influenced
the legislation as it wound through Congress during the next year, from
labor movement and civil rights lobbyists, to social movement activists
who kept the issue in the headlines, to white supremacists in the South
who also did so, to Justice Department officials, to the Supreme Court
Justices themselves. 79 Provisions that today seem like just plain common
sense stirred strong opposition from Northern Republicans. Title II
prompted so much Republican opposition that Congressional leaders
prepared two identical versions of the bill, one with a public accommoda-
tions provision, and a more "realistic" one without it. Within Congress,
Northern Republicans, who tended to oppose civil rights legislation, and
liberal Democrats, who wanted a stronger bill, were key voting blocs.
Both were needed to overcome veto power that the Southern Democrats
had held over national legislation since the New Deal. The following year
would draw thousands of individuals into high-stakes legislative maneu-
vering, lobbying by civil rights groups such as the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights, civic engagement, clergy appeals, and continued social
movement pressure, with the bill's supporters split constantly between
matters of principle and what could be "realistically" accomplished. Su-
preme Court Justices were unwillingly involved as the bill's drafters
parsed the Justices' ongoing responses to court cases involving student
sit-in demonstrators so as to draft a statute that would pass constitutional
muster.80 Sometimes, what hardly seemed realistic suddenly became so,
as when civil rights activists secured an employment discrimination provi-
sion by not backing down from thirty years of advocacy. At other times,
seemingly-inexplicable changes, such as the amendment of Title VII to
include sex, would reverberate until the present day.81 Along the way,
four little girls died in a church bombing in Birmingham, a president was
assassinated, and over 200,000 people marched on Washington for jobs
and freedom. 82 The result was the statute now known as the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.83
The output of all this was formal law-a text with various provisions,
many of them official guarantees of certain types of "rights." These are
the kinds of legal rights that have produced much criticism within the
78. Id.
79. The fullest account of that process is PURDUM, supra note 69, at 98-328; RISEN,
supra note 72, at 95-244; CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DE-
BATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr (1985); DONALD G. MOR-
GAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY 292-330 (1966).
80. Schmidt, supra note 39.
81. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 117-23. For an insightful account of the emergence of
sex discrimination in the statute, see Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of
Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1308 (2012).
82. See PURDUM, supra note 69, at 98-328; RISEN, supra note 72, at 95-244.
83. See WHALEN, supra note 79.
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scholarly community." Yet, as Chen, Yearby and Saucedo's essays
demonstrate, it would be a mistake to read that achievement in a narrow,
synchronic manner, or as a text that speaks clearly to the reader, or as a
means by which social movements locked themselves within limited con-
fines. The statute was the product of decades of advocacy, and more than
a year of formal statute-making punctuated with principled stands, politi-
cal compromises, heartfelt entreaties, violence, and the specter of an in-
tense and unresolved debate over just what equality might mean.
III. POST-ENACTMENT: ORGANIZERS, INTERPRETERS
AND DREAMERS
Much had been resolved in the creation of the words that went into the
Act. There were real reasons that supporters and opponents fought so
long and hard over those specific words. At the same time, much re-
mained to be resolved. The interpretive process that emerged from the
enacted statute was just as long, contentious, and unresolved as that
which preceded it. Take the addition of that one word, "sex," to Title VII,
for instance. Although some derided that provision as an accident, EEOC
staffers were surprised when a quarter of their initial complaints came
from women.85 The commission quickly found itself having to decide
whether the workplace conditions of "stewardesses," as they were then
called, constituted an "unlawful employment practice." 86 Suddenly, peo-
ple had a name for a form of inequality that mainstream culture had not
recognized before, and needed a set of legal theories to back it up. Pauli
Murray, a black woman civil rights lawyer who had lobbied hard to have
the term "sex" remain in the statute, saw much promise in that single
word. It played a role in convincing Murray to continue the legal work
that would later help the Supreme Court decide that sex discrimination
was actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment.87 In fact, the struggle
to define and redefine what exactly constitutes sex discrimination in em-
ployment, and how to prove it under law, continues to this day. It is a
debate that has drawn social movement activists, lawyers, Supreme Court
Justices, and the President of the United States into continuing disputes
such as Lilly Ledbetter's campaign for pay equity. 8 Given the aggressive
interpretation and reinterpretation that has been weighted on the statu-
tory language, one could hardly pretend that statute-making locked
Americans into a narrow interpretation of that language.
If the simple word "sex" could prompt such a debate, the malleable
nature of the statute was only enhanced by the complicated employment
discrimination provisions of Title VII. Power to enforce those provisions
84. See KENNEDY, supra note 11; Tani, supra note 11, at 369-83.
85. MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 119-31.
86. SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTs REVOLUTION (2011).
87. Id.
88. See Lilly Ledbetter Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009); Ledbet-
ter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
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was divided between the newly-created Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the Justice Department and private plaintiffs.89 Ti-
tle VII encompassed vague and conflicting phrases, such as "a bona fide
seniority or merit system," and a "professionally developed ability test ...
not designed, intended or used to discriminate," and "otherwise to dis-
criminate."90 Indeed, the statute did not even supply any real definition
of the term "discrimination." 91 Those complicated provisions emerged
from a statute-making process which involved many amendments to the
original bill, moves to insulate the bill from further amendment, and stra-
tegic calculations to respond to the objections of the statute's
opponents. 92
The enacted Title VII seemed so cumbersome that NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund (LDF) head Jack Greenberg called it "weak,
cumbersome" and "probably unworkable." 93 He was quickly proven
wrong. The reason was that the complicated structure of Title VII made it
the vehicle for any number of reform agendas. Thousands of complaints
quickly flooded the EEOC as workers sought to give meaning to the stat-
ute's text. The LDF quickly changed course. Helped along by a North
Carolinia civil rights lawyer named Julius Chambers, the organization
started a community organizing project in that state, with local residents
as paid field workers. Its objective was to transform race relations in local
workplaces. 94 Out of that effort would come significant changes in the
state's textile industry (unionization and integration), as well as a surpris-
ingly broad opinion by Chief Justice Burger in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
which recognized a disparate impact cause of action under the statute. 95
Of course, that was not the endpoint of the process. Title VII transformed
workplaces across the country, while the debates over how to read its
employment mandates would help birth a conservative legal movement
that organized itself in response to affirmative action and other interpre-
tive issues that arose from that text.96
Perhaps what was most radical about the statutory language was that
many of its most controversial provisions were interventions in the long-
running debate over federal power to transform local institutions. The
statute's federal funding provisions (Title VI), its authorization for the
Justice Department to file suit to compel integration (Titles III and IV),
and other provisions tipped the balance decisively in favor of federal
power to enforce school desegregation in the South. The Act built on the
civil rights movement's longstanding focus on federalizing basic citizen-
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. PURDUM, supra note 69, at 247-49; RISEN, supra note 72, at 200-23.
93. David J. Garrow, Toward a Definitive History of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 67
VAND. L. REv. 197, 205 (2014).
94. ROBERT BELTON, THE CRUSADE FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: THE
GRIGGS v. DUKE POWER STORY (2014).
95. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
96. MAcLEAN, supra note 8, at 225-64.
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ship rights, and on the Eisenhower Administration's push to increase fed-
eral funding for local schools. 97 The Southern region of the United States,
which in 1964 had the most racially segregated schooling system in the
country, had the most integrated schooling system by the 1970s.98 Those
gains were not self-executing, but in fact depended on the efforts of local
activists, federal officials, and community actors who believed in integra-
tion as a social good and worked to make it effective. 99 Much of that gain,
however, has been reversed within the past decade as the legal require-
ments that once backed up the push to maintain integration in the South
and in other parts of the country have been loosened or eliminated. 100 In
addition, as the essays gathered in this symposium remind us, the debates
prompted by the Act helped transform the entire country and produced
new movements such as that for language rights. Indeed, in more recent
debates over federal educational interventions such as the No Child Left
Behind Act and the Race to the Top Initiative, one can see echoes of
arguments about federal power to enforce equity in education that were
prompted by the Act. Such extensions of federal power drew directly on
the groundwork that was provided by the Civil Rights Act.
Then, of course, there are the dreamers-those who imagined that the
Civil Rights Act might have already enshrined transformative, utopian
ideals in law. One such dreamer was a young graduate student named
Catherine MacKinnon who, upon hearing of an administrator who re-
signed because of her supervisor's advances, came up with the theory that
the words "otherwise to discriminate" already supported an interpreta-
tion of Title VII that would define and prohibit something called "sexual
harassment." To many contemporary observers, such reasoning seemed
as though it had scant support in the legal materials comprising the Civil
Rights Act, but over time it has become both settled law and an idea that
has affected law and politics around the world.10' Yet another dreamer
was Kimberl6 Crenshaw, who looked at the interstices of the phrase "be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" and
saw a lack of a theory-or perhaps an emerging theory-that described
the multiple kinds of inequality experienced by women of color.102 That
idea had a name, intersectionality theory, and while it has not lodged
itself in formal law in the same manner as sexual harassment, it continues
97. Gary Orfield, The 1964 Civil Rights Act and American Education, in LEGACIES OF
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTs Acr (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).
98. CHARLES T. CLOTFIELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION (2006).
99. Orfield, supra note 97; CLOTFIELTER, supra note 98.
100. GARY ORFIELD, ERICA FRANKENBERG, JONGHEON YE, & JOHN KUSCERA,
BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT, AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE (May
15, 2014), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-educationlintegration-
and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-future/Brown-
at-60-051814.pdf.
101. Deborah Dinner, A Firebrand Flickers, LEGAL AFFAIRS (March/April 2006);
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
102. Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 357.
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to transform debates in fields far removed from the employment discrimi-
nation cases that prompted its creation. The dreaming continues apace,
with newer ideas percolating up under the banner of performance theory,
which propounds new readings of workplace discrimination that allow
one to describe how a formally integrated workplace might nonetheless
be filled with legally actionable race discrimination. 10 3 Whether these
newer dreams might find themselves recognized in formal law remains to
be seen, but they continue in the long tradition of reimagining the con-
tours of law that preceded the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, were
incorporated into the Act's contentious enactment process, and continue
to this day.
IV. CONCLUSIONS: HOW MIGHT WE REMEMBER THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT GOING FORWARD
Drawing on the illuminating essays by Chen, Yearby and Saucedo,
what has been offered here might be termed a brief "biography" of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, a statute whose pregnant, generative language is
the product of a long history of argument and activism, as well as a legis-
lative process of unprecedented complexity, and whose meaning contin-
ues to evolve to this day. Are we at the end of its life-or at least the
productive, generative phase of its life-as one might conclude by read-
ing it as a simple set of words incorporating a fairly narrow stretch of
meaning and history? It would do violence to the long history of the Civil
Rights Act to read it as a simple text which one can interpret through the
usual lawyers' tools of statutory construction. It would also impoverish
our collective imagination to read the statute as some sort of endpoint in
that process, apart from the long stream of debate, contestation and ad-
vocacy on the subject of inequality into which the Act inevitably flows. Is
this the unique story of the Civil Rights Act, or perhaps a larger story that
one could deploy with many other sources of formal law-statutes, judi-
cial opinions, and the like? Is this an analysis that applies solely to the
Act, or does it have implications for a more general consideration of for-
mal legal rights and entitlements? I leave those questions for others to
answer. For the moment, it is sufficient to mark off some interpretive, and
historical ground, that leaves the Civil Rights Act where it should be: as a
transformative text that encapsulates our ongoing struggle to define just
what equality means in world where there have always been multiple
meanings of that seemingly simple idea.
103. DEVON CARBADO & MITu GULATI, ACTING WITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN
POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013).
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